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Introduction 
There is an old and popular Chinese saying which expresses the importance of food for Chinese 
people: 民以食為天 (min yi shi wei tian). It means that people regard food as their heaven; 
their primary requirement. China's relationship with food is a complex one, ambiguous at best. 
After a long history of struggling to provide for the Chinese population, the country finally 
achieved self-sufficiency after 1995,1 and from that point it went on to become the largest 
producer and consumer of food in the world 2 and a major player in the global food supply 
system. Within the past three decades, the Chinese food system has evolved from a state-
regulated system, in which season, geographic location and regional taste determined the 
supply, to the current modern market food supply system, in which a wide variety is on offer all 
year round, and consumer demand and global market forces determine the supply. Reform, 
privatisation and individualisation appear to have led to responsibility for food supply being 
distributed between the State, the food industry and consumers.3  
 This rapid transformation of the food infrastructure poses many challenges for the 
implementation of an effective domestic food safety system. Records of food safety issues in 
China can be traced back to the middle of the last century, however, until the end of the last 
century at least most of those issues could be categorised as conventional risks attributable to 
lack of knowledge and often concerning failures in food processing hygiene.4 Since roughly the 
beginning of this century, Chinese society has been plagued by new types of food safety 
problem, involving unsafe foods and poisonous foods. These are foods contaminated due to 
excessive use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides, hormones, steroids, preservatives, flavour 
enhancers and colorants (among other things), and manifest as a global phenomenon resulting 
from modern farming and food processing technologies. A common characteristic is often 
deliberate, profit-driven contamination.5 One of the earliest severe food safety incidents in 
China to receive national media coverage was that of the poisonous Jinhua ham in 2003, in 
which several small producers continued to produce Jinhua hams out of season, and soaked the 
hams in pesticide to prevent spoilage and insect infestation during the warmer months.6 In the 
past fifteen years, several large-scale food safety problems have materialised in China which 
have led to nationwide and even region-wide food scares affecting large groups of people in 
society, and resulting in widespread consumer concern and a mistrust of domestic food 																																																								
1 Bian 2004, p. 2. 
2 Wang 2013, p. 114.  
3 Klein 2013, p. 378. 
4 Yan 2012, p. 709.  
5 Yan 2012, pp. 714-717. 
6 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Food-safety-incidents-in-China (accessed 16 March 2016) 
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production. What these extensive food scares have brought to the surface is that this is a 
structural problem, a system failure involving not only producers, but also government 
institutions and officials at different levels.  
 German sociologist Ulrich Beck argues that according to his theory of ‘Risk Society’,7 the 
food safety problems in China are especially complex because China's non-democratic political 
system obstructs public reflexivity.8 Furthermore, China is going through a 'compressed 
modernization',9 combining a largely industrial state with elements of a post-industrial state, 
and therefore presents a mix of different types of risks.10 Beck calls for shared responsibility 
and the opening up of policy making to greater levels of public accountability.11 
 Since the outbreak of several major food scares in China in the early 2000s, the subject has 
attracted the attention of scholars, and has been a topic for research and analysis. Scholarly 
attention has been concentrated on the analysis and critique of the Chinese government's 
development of a legislative and regulatory framework for food safety since the reforms of the 
1980s. There is some literature on the response of Chinese consumers and their expectations for 
food safety control systems, and this largely blames the food processing industry and looks to 
the government to legislate for adequate food safety and quality control.12 There are fewer 
academic studies which examine food safety infrastructure and the division of responsibilities 
in the food supply chain from a production-level perspective. In my opinion the current 
literature presents a rather one-sided and ambiguous picture of the State/private industry nexus 
underlying Chinese food infrastructure. On the one hand, it presents a retreating state in a 
rapidly transforming supply chain; a state which is clearly designating responsibility to the food 
industry as a natural consequence of decades of deregulation and privatisation of the market.13 
On the other hand, the literature presents a state which interferes directly in the food supply 
chain at the expense of market mechanisms, and implements an increasing number of policies 
which more specifically define state control at all levels of governance. This ambiguity and 
one-sided point of view demands further inquiry into the development of state control versus 
self-regulation in the food production industry. This will help to determine whether a diffuse 
division of responsibilities may point to risk perception gaps in Chinese food safety control 
systems which could account for the deficiencies in the system.  																																																								
7 Beck 1992; Many of Beck's ideas were - although with different nuances and perspectives - developed in the 
same period by Anthony Giddens (for example in his book of 1990 'The consequences of modernity') and by Mary 
Douglas (for example in her book of 1985 'Risk acceptability according to the social sciences'). 
8 Thiers 2003, pp. 243-244. 
9 Compressed modernization in contrast to Western gradual modernization, Yan 2012, p. 706. 
10 Beck, Deng, Shen 2010, p. 208; Yan 2012, p. 706. 
11 Yates 2003, p. 106; Beck 2000, pp. 226-227; Thiers 2003, pp. 242-243. 
12 Ortega et al. 2011, pp. 319, 323; Yan 2012, pp. 717-718.  
13 Food Safety Law 2009, article 3; responsibility is also assumed by leaving out specifications of many articles.  
	 4	
 This paper offers an initial insight into the way in which Chinese food processors perceive 
the development of state influence in the food supply chain, and of the State's legislative and 
regulatory regime. In other words: how is the rapid transformation of the food supply chain and 
the continued state reform of food regulation shaping the relationship between the State and the 
private food processing industry, and how is this affecting food safety control systems from the 
perspective of the food processors? This paper addresses an interrelated set of questions: what 
is the nature of the development of the Chinese food supply chain? Is it fragmented; 
lengthening and becoming more complex, or is it shortening; scaling up and becoming more 
efficient? How are distribution channels evolving and what is the role of the Chinese 
consumer? What is the level of state control and ownership in the food chain? Is it clear at 
production level what production requirements and quality standards must be complied with, 
and is there regular contact with government officials at this level? Is the private sector 
involved in the continuing regulatory improvements and what is the role and importance of 
industry associations? Do they, as in Europe, serve as independent intermediaries between the 
State and the private sector? 
 The main finding of this exploratory work is that, according to Chinese food processors,14 
there is no ambiguity about the State's strategy of control of the food supply chain, and nor is 
there any confusion about the legislative and regulatory regime. Furthermore, the food 
processors' overall opinion of the government's strategy and step-by-step approach to the 
development and improvement of food safety control systems is rather positive and does not 
point to major differences in the perception of risks between the State and the private food 
processing industry. My argumentation consists of four parts, and starts with the premise that in 
the process of the rapid transformation of the food supply chain and the diversification of 
distribution channels, the State is maintaining firm control, both directly and indirectly. In 
particular, the government is managing the development of the supply chain carefully, is in 
charge of the direction of national industrial development, and gives priority to sensitive and 
key industries in order to secure food supply and increase food quality and safety. The second 
argument contradicts current literature which critiques the so-called fragmented and segmented 
model of regulatory authority which causes overlaps, gaps and inconsistencies, as well as 
leading to a lack of clearly defined responsibilities and quality and supervision standards. My 
research presents a rather different picture: the framework is clear and transparent, 
responsibilities are defined at all levels, and the private sector is involved in policy making in 
several direct and indirect ways. This is not to say that the industry sees no deficiencies in the 																																																								
14 NB. The Chinese processors involved in this exploratory work are all professional, fully compliant, urban-area 
players in the food industry.  
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current system. The third argument illustrates that, although industry associations in China 
operate – as they do in Europe – as two-way intermediaries between the State and the private 
sector, they are not independent. On the contrary, they serve as semi-official institutions which 
facilitate private businesses and complement the official regulatory 'window'. Finally, I raise 
doubts as to whether Beck's plea against the logic of control in a ‘Risk Society’ is applicable to 
China. China is following a different path towards modernisation, combining a compressed 
modernisation process with a change from a state-planned economy to a largely market-based 
economy. Risk Society has come to China in the sense that Chinese society is also exposed to 
'manufactured' risks, such as ecological crises, food safety scares and the global financial crisis; 
all hazards caused not by nature or other external forces, but rather by the products of 
modernisation.15 The current reality in China, however, is that key stakeholders in the food 
supply infrastructure are not blaming these risks on the failure of government institutions. On 
the contrary, they are sufficiently content with – and even encourage – the logic of control 
employed by the State. The above mentioned four arguments will be discussed in the next four 
sections. Each section will start with a brief review of current academic literature and theory, 
followed by the findings of my research. 
 My research is based on an exploratory two-step approach. The first step, conducted in the 
Netherlands from April until mid-May 2016,16 is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the 
structure of the food supply chain and the food processing companies' relationship with the 
State in China through interviews and contact with specialists in the field. This served as 
preparation for the second step, conducted in the second half of May 2016,17 which consisted of 
on-location inquiry with food production companies in the Shanghai region and Jiangsu 
province, to allow for observation of and direct input from the perception at production level of 
food regulation reform, and how it is shaping state/private sector responsibilities and 
relationships. These on-location interviews in China were arranged with difficulty; illustrative 
of caution on the part of food processing companies and of the sensitivity of the subject. The 
interviews were partly conducted in Chinese. Key areas of investigation were food supply chain 
development, the development and enforcement of food regulatory reforms, and the role of 
industry associations, in order to assess the perception at production level of the state/private 
control axis in the food safety control regime, and how this affects the level and nature of risk 
in the food supply chain. The small scale of this research and the broad scope of the industries 
																																																								
15 Beck 1992, pp. 2-3, 183. 
16 Details of study set up and list of contacts of research step one in Appendices. 
17 Details of study set up and list of respondents of research step two in Appendices. 
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incorporated allow only for indicative results, and more quantitative validation will be required 
before it will be possible to draw conclusions. In addition, a sector by sector approach would be 
advisable, since the food industry in China is, as it is elsewhere, both vast and diverse, the 
development of the sectors is divergent and incorporates many different kinds of problem.  
  
Development and control of China's food supply chain 
Along with the extensive economic and social reforms which have effected a shift from a 
centrally planned to a market-based economy since the end of the 1970s, China's food supply 
system has also undergone comprehensive changes. The lengthening and increasing complexity 
of the food supply chain is often mentioned as a cause of persistent food safety problems.18 
Current literature does not present a clear picture – indeed it could sometimes be seen as 
ambiguous – of how the food supply chain is developing or of the interaction of key 
stakeholders in that development. My exploratory research indicates, however, that the State is 
retaining firm control of the development of the food supply chain in direct and indirect ways 
deemed necessary, at least for now, by consumers and processors alike to secure food supply 
and increase food quality and safety in a supply chain that is still in the process of transition. 
This section will look at the following questions: what is the nature of the development of the 
Chinese food supply chain? Is it fragmented, lengthening and becoming more complex; or 
shortening, scaling up and becoming more efficient? How are distribution channels evolving 
and what is the role of the Chinese consumer? What is the level of state control and ownership 
in the food chain? The first part of this section will review the literature on the transformation 
of China's supply chain; the second part presents my research findings, concentrating on the 
question of the level of control and interference by the State in the development of the food 
supply chain. 
 
The transformation of China's food supply system and its impact on market and 
consumer 
According to Veeck et al.19 we can roughly divide the transformation of China's food supply 
system into three periods. First, the period from 1949 to 1979 can be characterised as one in 
which the selection of food was very limited, the State controlled the entire food supply chain 
from farm to table, and consumer purchasing behaviour was either determined by domestic 
																																																								
18 Wu, 2012.  
19 Veeck et al. 2010, pp. 224-225. 
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cultivation, farm markets or state issued food rations. For many Chinese this period is 
synonymous with a monotonous diet, malnutrition and famine. During the second period, from 
1979 until the mid-1990s, land reform, de-collectivisation and privatisation had a major impact 
on the food supply system, and resulted in increased variety, the extension of seasons due to 
irrigation and fertilisation, improved production efficiency, higher quality and more innovative 
products, and the emergence of specialty food outlets started by entrepreneurs (e.g. bakeries, 
poultry stands, small grocery stores) alongside traditional food markets. The third period, from 
the mid-1990s up to the present, is significant because of China's engagement with regional and 
global economies. International production companies and food retailers now complement 
domestic supermarket chains and wholesalers in Chinese cities. Packaged goods of all kinds 
have emerged on the shelves of Chinese stores, along with branded products, chilled and frozen 
products, and certified products such as green and organic produce. One-stop shopping has 
been added to the traditional food markets and the specialty stores. The whole spectrum of food 
retail outlets in China now ranges from traditional farmers’ markets (morning markets), 
traditional covered food markets, specialty stores, supermarkets, hypermarkets and department 
stores.20 Most recently, online retail has been added to this mix, and with an annual growth of 
50%, (sales of fresh food now make up 12-13% of online sales) e-commerce is becoming one 
of the main channels of food distribution.21 Veeck et al. sums all this up as follows: ‘The once 
strongly regulated food system is now subject to the competing interests of farmers, 
manufacturers, and retailers in a "socialist market economy"’.22 
 This rapid transformation of the food supply system influences how Chinese consumers 
perceive the benefits, and also the risks, involved.23 Research conducted in five major Chinese 
cities (Beijing, Nanjing, Changchun, Shijiazhuang and Kunming)24 confirms that consumers 
greatly appreciate the increased variety of outlets and the opportunity this offers for personal 
choice and convenience, but feel that privatisation of the food system has developed too 
quickly for the government to be able to regulate it adequately. There is widespread mistrust of 
profit-driven food producers and vendors, who are the main culprits in the current food 
problems in the eyes of consumers. The variety of food products now available to Chinese 
consumers thanks to market-led food supply is welcomed by all, but the selection of safe and 
affordable food of good quality takes care and time; in other words, food shopping has become 
a 'risky business'. The delocalisation of the food supply, i.e. the de-linking of consumers from 																																																								
20 Veeck et al 2010, p. 226. 
21 Joint project Wageningen University 2015, pp. 13-14. 
22 Veeck et al. 2010, p. 222. 
23 Veeck et al. 2010, p. 225.  
24 Klein 2013, pp. 381-389; Veeck et al. 2010, pp. 228 - 232. 
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the place of origin, and the lengthening of the production chain,25 are a cause for concern to 
many consumers, and have led to an atmosphere of anxiety and mistrust. This affects consumer 
behaviour in many ways, from selecting only trusted suppliers to visiting rural out-of-town 
farms to buy produce at the weekend.26 On the other hand, continuing urbanisation, rising 
income and the accompanying improvement of living standards also exert a constant pressure 
for a greater variety of value-added products.27 According to research, the Chinese consumer 
has the most confidence in government-run certification programmes, and prefers direct 
government involvement in food safety over other market options.28 
 The rapid transformation to an increasingly liberal market economy, combined with a re-
engagement with the global economy, has offered the food industry opportunities which were 
formerly unimaginable, and has resulted in the unprecedented and often unregulated growth of 
processors and producers in the food supply chain.29 In primary food sectors such as the dairy 
industry, the privatisation of state-owned companies has led to the establishment of a large 
number of small-scale private dairy farms and processing facilities. Encouraged by the State, 
and sponsored by international donors, milk production has increased considerably.30 However, 
this has also resulted in a fragmentation of production in the supply chain, and efficiency and 
quality standards have not been maintained. Quality problems are illustrated by an example by 
Pei et al: an analysis carried out after the 2008 Sanlu milk scandal resulted in the immediate 
closure of 4,000 of the 20,393 milk collection stations ‘due to substandard operating conditions 
or the lack of the right equipment or sanitary conditions’.31 On the other hand, the literature 
indicates that the State is still interfering directly and indirectly at a central and local level, 
rather than allowing for private investment and a market mechanism. Hidden local subsidies 
and relationships obstruct the transparency of the market and counteract central policies. In this 
way, international assistance such as the China-EU Dairy project (1996-2001) has failed to be 
sufficiently effective. This is indicative of a state primarily focused on growth, reluctant to give 
up control, and unable to manage the transition from central to local policies.32  
 To summarise: a review of the literature points to a rapid transformation of the food system 
in which the supply chain has lengthened, has become increasingly fragmented and complex, 
																																																								
25 Wu 2012, p. 1.  
26 Klein 2013, p. 387. 
27 Liu et al. 2013, p. 94; Gale and Huang 2007, p iii. 
28 Ortega 2011, p. 323. 
29 Breslin 2013, p. 157. 
30 Delman 2003, p. 6:	for example, the dairy cow population grew 10-fold, from 0.5 million to 5 million, between 
1979 and 2000; Internal note 2013, p. 11: China's domestic milk production grew between 2000 and 2007 from 
approx. 10 billion to more than 35 billion liters.  
31 Pei et al. 2011, p. 418. 
32 Delman 2003, pp. 10-11, 13, 18, 26. 
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and has distanced consumers, who mistrust profit-driven food processors. The State, as third 
key stakeholder, is portrayed as simultaneously retreating and maintaining control in the 
development of the food supply chain. 
 
Food supply chain: direct and indirect interference by the State  
There is no doubt that the rapid transformation of the Chinese economy, urbanisation and the 
rising living standards of the Chinese have had a major impact on the food system. What is not 
clear from the currently available literature is to what extent the State is adopting a strategy of 
less control and less interference in the food supply chain. What is the direction of their 
strategy? 
 The first part of my research supplied several insights into the primary food sector: the 
agribusinesses in food supply, such as dairy, meat and poultry. In China, these food industries 
are characterised by a fragmented supply chain consisting of numerous very small and 
inefficient players at all stages of the chain, but nevertheless still accounting for a considerable 
part of the business.33 While, in the 1980s, the State was encouraging the replacement of state-
owned farms by small-scale farming in order to bring about a rapid increase in output and 
supplement farmers' incomes, more recently – and especially since the 2008 melamine crisis – 
the State has been actively pushing for the up-scaling of farms and the phasing out of some 
steps in the chain; in other words shortening the supply chain. For example, the Chinese 
government has developed a Master Plan for China's Dairy Development (2009-2013)34 which 
aims to scale farms up, phase out milking stations to shorten the dairy chain, and improve 
quality control and traceability in the dairy sector. One of the accompanying regulatory changes 
is the introduction of a licensing and review system for milk collection. In dairy production, 
licenses will only be renewed for processors of milk and infant milk formula if they have 
advanced equipment for self-inspection across a wide range of food additives.35 The influence 
of the State is also noticeable in the interference in business and investment models in the dairy 
industry. The industry is experimenting with different vertical integration and clustering 
models, but the State is clearly only supporting the larger-scale models with land and finance.36 
However, my contact acknowledges that reforms in the chain must be carried out gradually, 
since the demand for milk products greatly exceeds supply in China, and the employment of a 
																																																								
33 Contact C. Internal note 2013, p. 1. gives an example of the Dairy industry: farmers with less than 100 heads 
account for about 60 percent of the supply. 
34 Internal note 2013, p. 7. 
35 Internal note 2013, p. 3, 7; confirmed by Contact C. 
36 Internal note 2013, p. 4; this point was confirmed by Respondent I in the second phase of research.  
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large part of the population is involved.37 A similar development is visible in the pork and 
poultry industries,38 where the State is also encouraging vertical integration and the clustering 
of steps in the supply chain in order to secure food supply and improve quality. Although 
private corporations are expanding, the State continues to play a central role in determining the 
course of market expansion and the destination of profits. State and private elites are 
cooperating to lead agrarian transformation, but it is the State that is inviting parties to the table 
and appointing the major agents who then become part of a state-led political project serving 
modernisation goals at a national level. 39 Some interviewees40 expressed understanding for this 
strategy, and remarked on the lack of responsibility still displayed in many parts of the food 
industry, and originating either from lack of knowledge or a different mind-set. Another point 
emphasised41 was that the Chinese food industry is not yet accustomed to a so-called 'pre-
competitive' form of cooperation: players (i.e. competitors) in the same food sector cooperating 
to improve quality, safety and innovation in the sector as a whole with the idea that all parties 
involved will benefit. This form of cooperation is evident in many Western food industries, as 
well as being apparent in the role and importance of industry associations.  
 The food companies interviewed in the Shanghai region and Jiangsu province in the second 
step of my research42 confirm the continued firm state control described above. They also 
express the understanding that this is currently probably the best way forward, and even 
advocate a harsher 'no tolerance' strategy. As one respondent put it: ‘It is important for the 
government to be strict on the small things, not wait until it becomes a big issue’.43 There are 
many examples of continued or even tightened state control in agribusiness, particularly in the 
dairy sector. The State has openly communicated its objective of bringing down the number of 
milk powder processors – particularly those processing milk powder for infants – drastically in 
order to improve food safety control. Various numbers were mentioned, but it would appear 
that the plan is to cut the number of processors by at least 50%, not by allowing market 
mechanisms to work, but through direct interference by the government.44 One of the new 
measures being implemented is the requirement for milk powder processors to combine the 
process of spray-drying the raw milk, mixing and packing in one facility.45 The policy requires 																																																								
37 Contact C; Internal note 2013, p. 10.  
38 Schneider 2016, p. 1; to give an impression of the magnitude of the pork business in China: "China is home to 
half of the world's pigs, half of global pork production and half of worldwide pork consumption". In 2014 the 
number of pigs in China totaled 770 million head.  
39 Schneider 2016, pp. 4-5.  
40 Contact C, confirmed in the second phase of research by Respondents I, II, III, IX, X. 
41 A point made by contact C, in the second phase of research confirmed by respondent I and X. 
42 Respondents are not mentioned if subject or statement is possibly sensitive.  
43 Expressed by respondent II. 
44 Respondent I, VIII, X.  
45 This new policy was explained by respondent I. 
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this measure to be effective within one year, and aims to phase out the large number of 
processors who only mix sourced powdered milk. Among this type of processor/mixer there are 
a number of major players, but also a great many small players, who are suspected of being the 
cause of the persistent problems with milk powder. However, one critique heard46 is that this 
measure is not feasible, because it will not be possible for the larger players in the market to 
rearrange their entire production process within a year. Furthermore, up to now the number of 
dairy processors that have actually been closed down is low due to the previously mentioned 
issue of enforcement at a local level and the importance of local employment. The government 
is therefore attempting alternative measures, and is currently closing the back door, requiring 
the central (CFDA, Beijing level) registration of all milk powder and infant milk formula 
recipes.47 This is also aimed at phasing out small players in particular, as well as at preventing 
new ones from entering by raising the entrance level standards. Small players48 currently often 
use the same recipe for different products in different channels, something else which this 
regulation aims to prevent.49 In addition, the State has recently issued a policy regulation 
limiting each production site for infant formula to producing only three brands, with a total of 
nine recipes; all regulations aimed at improving the State's ability to control the process. One 
respondent from the field of packaged goods and value added foods50 confirmed the continued 
state control, and offered as an example a method used by the State in the packaged goods 
sector. In the respondent's line of business this is apparent in the imposition of increasingly 
high production requirements, especially capital intensive hardware requirements, which make 
it virtually impossible for small players to obtain a production license for food processing, or to 
stay in business when the renewal of the production license is due after three years. However, 
this person also noted, as mentioned above, the hesitation at local level to actually close down 
businesses, especially at a time when the economy is slowing down. 
 Other evidence of tightening state control was given by a respondent who had gained access 
to a Chinese government document outlining development and reform strategies for industry in 
a number of decrees effected in May 2013.51 He mentioned the decrees regarding the minimum 
sizes for companies producing rice and soy bean that were to be allowed to remain in business 
and for smaller businesses which would be required to upscale to avoid closure. Upon request, 
																																																								
46 Respondent I. 
47 This point and the next were made by respondent I and VIII.  
48 Small players usually do not have a processing facility themselves but mix sourced raw materials, i.e. milk 
powders. 
49 Explanation by respondent VIII. 
50 Respondent IX.  
51 Respondent X.  
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the Chinese document was supplied.52 This contained the following other interesting insights 
into the State's strategy for food production companies.53 The document contains three 
categories of measures: encouraging measures (鼓勵類), restrictive measures (限制類) and 
elimination or selection measures (淘汰類).54 The first category of measures involves the 
overall development and application of standardisation and the cultivation of good quality, 
larger scale and efficient technology (优质、高产、高校标准化栽培技术开发与应用) as 
well as high speed manufacturing lines in food industries (高速食品饮料制造生产线).55 
Furthermore, there is an 11 page list of all kinds of production machinery to be encouraged 
above a certain capacity in order to increase efficiency and the level of innovation.56 The 
general content of the second category of measures includes a limitation on machinery under a 
certain capacity,57 as well as environmental and safety matters. The third category urges the 
replacement of outdated production equipment (落后生产工艺装备) in all industries. In the 
light industries, the document calls for the replacement of industries with a relatively low 
production capacity, such as salt production, soft drink bottling and cornstarch production, and 
the shutting down of all manual butchering of live animals (猪、牛、羊、禽手工屠宰工
艺).58 All examples are illustrative of the continuation or even tightening of state control in 
industries rather than of a shift to control by market mechanisms.  
 Even though many of the examples given in this paragraph concern the primary sectors 
rather than the value-added processing food sectors, they are exemplary of a state which 
dominates the food production industry, giving priority to sensitive and key industries, 
unwilling to relinquish control, and fully in charge of the direction of national industrial 
development. The Chinese State is demonstrating its responsibility for securing the food 
supply, and is carefully managing the development of the supply chain in order to increase food 
quality and safety. My research indicates that although there is consent for this policy at 
production level, there is also a view that it will take some time for local reality to catch up 
completely with this strategy and make it more effective. The next section details my second 
argument and concerns the nature and development of the State's legislative and regulatory 
																																																								
52 Decree no. 21, 2013.  
53 The 110-page document encompasses strategies for the primary, secondary and tertiary industries, food 
companies occupy only a small portion of the total and are listed among the light industries (轻工). 
54 淘汰 (tao tai) means eliminate through selection or competition with the objective to modernize/innovate, 
replace the old.  
55 Decree no. 21, 2013, p. ii, 1. 
56 Decree no. 21, 2013, pp. 20-31.  
57 Among others the example of soy bean production, Decree no. 21, 2013, p. 79.  
58 Decree no. 21, 2013, pp. 95-97.  
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framework. 
 
Assessment of reform and governance of the State's food safety control system  
China has long been an isolated food economy, and has only gradually became more open and 
active since the 1980s, when Chinese state reforms started to focus on economic growth and 
creating the conditions for industrial growth. These measures have clearly been effective: the 
average annual growth rate in the food industry in China is over 13%.59 The accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 further accelerated development (see Figure 1).60  
 
Figure 1. China's total grain, meat, aquatic products, eggs, and milk production from 1949 to 
200861 
 
However, the fact that the number of severe food safety incidents has also risen rapidly in the 
past 15 years,62 is evidence of deficiencies in the national food control system. Critical 
scholarship finds fault with the State's fragmented and segmented model of regulatory authority 
(i.e. a lack of clear definition of responsibilities), which has been responsible for gaps, overlaps 
and inconsistencies in control. In addition, the problems are also attributed to a lack of clear 
quality and supervision standards for production. My research, however, offers a different 
viewpoint: a production level perspective, which holds that the current legislative and 
regulatory framework is clear and transparent, responsibilities are well-defined at all levels of 
																																																								
59 Bai et al. 2007, p. 480.  
60 Wang 2013, p. 114; Pearson 2007, p. 113. 
61 Jianhua Zhang J. Exp. Bot. 2011; jxb.err132 (data from the National Bureau of Statistics of China); World Bank 
food production index show similar high growth figures from end of 1990s. 
62 Bai et al. 2007, p. 481: e.g. the number of registered food poisoning cases quadrupled between 2001 and 2004. 
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governance, and the private sector is involved in policy making in several direct and indirect 
ways. That does not mean that there is no critique from food processors on the current system, 
but it does not concern the content and structure of the control system itself. In this section, I 
will discuss the following related questions. Are the production requirements and quality 
standards which must be complied with clear at production level? What is the nature of contact 
with officials and is the official counterpart for different types of questions clear? To what 
extent is the private sector involved in the continuing regulatory improvements? This section 
will start with a brief overview of the development of the national food safety control system 
from the second half of the twentieth century up to and including the implementation of the 
Food Safety Law (FSL) of 2009.63 It also includes the main critiques of the system by scholars. 
In the second part, an assessment of the current system from the production level perspective, 
based on my research, will be presented.  
 
Development of the reform of the State's legislative and regulatory framework on food 
processing 
The Chinese State has struggled to keep the food legislative and regulatory framework in tune 
with market development. The first food regulation in China, the Food Hygiene Regulations on 
Administration (provisional), dates from 1965.64 This was a period in which the government 
was primarily concerned with the sufficiency of the food supply.65 These regulations 
predominantly dealt with the level of cleanliness demanded for facilities in which food 
products were manufactured, stored and transported. In 1982 the Food Hygiene Law (FHL) 
was enacted, the main aim of which was to set standards for food content, additives, packaging 
and manufacturing conditions in a period of economic reform and growing numbers of 
privately owned food manufacturing enterprises. Its concern was to deal with food hygiene in 
the sense of rotten or dirty food ingredients and unhygienic processes and production locations. 
It also prescribed penalties for violations of the FHL. The 1982 law was thoroughly updated in 
1995, when requirements for production locations and equipment, as well as packaging, storage 
and distribution conditions, were laid out more clearly. Furthermore, the 1995 FHL stipulated 
that the Ministry of Health (MOH) was the authority with overall responsibility for the 
administration and supervision of food hygiene. Because there were still eight official agencies, 
																																																								
63 Food Safety Law 2009.  
64 This paragraph draws on Bai 2007, pp. 482-483; Bian 2004, pp. 3-5; Jia and Jukes 2013, pp. 238-239; Pei et al. 
2011, p. 415. 
65 China was recovering from a famine in which an estimated 30 - 45 million people died.  
	 15	
which overlapped to some extent, responsible for various aspects of food safety,66 the State 
Council issued an Act called "Decision on further enhancing food safety management" in 2004 
to harmonise the regulatory agencies. The duties of each department were linked to different 
parts of the supply chain (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Food safety regulation agencies and duties 200467 
 
The responsibility for manufacturing and processing was assigned to Administration for 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ). This department implemented the 
'Food Quality Safety Market Access System (QS system) between 2003 and 2006. This divided 
the food sector into 28 categories, and introduced a compulsory food safety admittance system 
(QS tag on food packaging), which still appears on every certified packaged food in food retail 
(see Image 1).  
 
Image 1. Compulsory QS tag on retail food packaging 
 
 Criticism and challenges faced by the Chinese government date back to the mid 1990s, 
when incidents of severe pesticide poisoning, coupled with an inadequate state response, 
demonstrated that legislation and regulatory control was unable to protect consumers from the 																																																								
66 Bai et al. 2007, pp. 481-482: Department of Agriculture (DA), Ministry of Public Security (MPS), Board of 
Trade (BOT), Ministry of Health (MOH), Administration for Industry and Commerce (AIC), Administration for 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA), 
Environment Protection Agency (EPA), all directly under the lead of State Council of China.  
67 According to Bai et al. 2007. 
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consequences of unscrupulous food production.68 In the wake of the 2003/2004 Fuyang milk 
scandal, the AQSIQ conducted a nation-wide inspection of about 2,000 types of food and 
concluded that 20 - 25% was unfit for consumption. The extensive scholarly criticism of the 
Chinese food safety regulatory regime before the implementation of the Food Safety Law in 
2009 can be summarised as three key areas of bureaucratic failure. The area most commonly 
criticised has been the fragmentation of the regulatory authorities: the above mentioned eight 
regulatory agencies and their administrations were involved, which resulted in both overlaps 
and gaps in duties, leading to incongruities and regulatory vacuums. In addition, regulatory 
capacity decreased down the levels (from central/national to provincial, county and village 
level), leading to the modified implementation of central policies at a local level. Furthermore, 
the competing interests of the central-level regulatory agencies (most of them ministerial 
agencies) obstructed initiatives for improvement. For example, the State Food and Drug 
Administration (SFDA) agency, modelled on the FDA in the United States, was introduced in 
2003 to streamline the fragmented regulatory agencies, but was strongly resisted by existing 
agencies, and this resulted in it having only limited, and thus less effective, authority. A second 
area of criticism has been the conflicting roles of local officials, who are responsible for both 
regulatory duties and revenues. Since the late 1990s, government reforms have stipulated that 
regional and local regulatory administration costs must be funded from the central government 
budget, leading to the under-funding of government bureaucracy in many rural areas. There 
have been frequent cases of local officials who have been tempted to choose money over 
safety, resulting in a lax attitude towards violations of the food legislation and the issuing of 
licenses to unqualified enterprises. Finally, in addition to the fragmentation and conflicts of 
interest in food safety regulation, there was and still is, the problem of the regulatory divide 
between urban and rural areas. Regulatory capacity is concentrated in densely populated areas, 
and the AQSIQ control mechanism has concentrated on large and middle-sized food 
companies. But in 2005, 70% of Chinese food enterprises consisted of small, family-run 
workshops with fewer than 10 workers, and even though they accounted for only 5% of total 
food production, most spurious or inferior foods originated from this type of enterprise. 
Comprehensive reform of food regulation in China was long overdue, and the melamine infant 
formula scandal in 2008 accelerated the implementation of the Food Safety Law in 2009. 
 
 The enactment of the Food Safety Law (FSL) at the 7th session of the 11th Standing 
Committee of the National People's Congress of China on February 28, 2009, and its 																																																								
68 This paragraph draws on Bai et al. 2007, p. 483; Bian 2004, pp. 8-11; Tam and Yang 2005, pp. 9-15, 17-22; 
Thiers 2003, pp. 243-249. 
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subsequent implementation on June 1, 2009,69 is regarded as a turning point in the continuing 
struggle with food regulation which began with China's re-engagement with the global political 
economy. The Food Safety Law (FSL) of 2009 was modelled on the EU regulatory framework 
for food safety and it's 'farm to fork' principle, renamed in China as the 'farm to table' 
principle.70 The overall objectives of this extensive reform were to implement a modern food 
safety system that would meet international expectations and restore the confidence of Chinese 
consumers in domestic food by raising food safety standards within the legislative framework, 
restructuring responsibilities and the division of power and strengthening the regulatory 
framework of quality control and information. The FSL contains 104 articles in ten chapters71 
and encompasses legislative reforms, control management reforms, inspection & laboratory 
reforms and plans for an information, education and training system. The most important 
improvement was the definition of responsibilities: a decrease in the number of regulatory 
authorities and clarification of the responsibilities of each department at each step of the 
production chain. The reforms also included the establishment of the State Council's Food 
Safety Committee, which includes the high-level officials of all relevant ministries, and aims to 
improve government coordination and enforcement in order to solve systematic food safety 
problems. Figure 2 depicts the new structure of control management in the food supply chain, 
and Table 2 gives an overview of each department’s responsibilities at each step of the supply 
chain.72  
 
Figure 2. Food safety control management in the food supply chain FSL 200973 
 
* The update of the FSL 2015 assigned the responsibility of domestic food production to the FDA and 
import/export to the AQSIQ. 																																																								
69 FSL 2009. 
70 This paragraph draws especially on the comprehensive review of Jia and Jukes 2013, pp. 239-244, but also Li et 
al. 2010, pp. 292-293; Pei et al. 2011, pp. 414-418; Wang et al. 2013, pp. 118-119; Song and Tian 2012, pp. 326-
328. 
71 FSL 2009. 
72 Li et al. 2010, p. 293; Jia and Jukes 2013, p. 239-240. 
73 According to Li et al. 2010; Jia and Jukes 2013. 
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Table 2. The responsibility of each supervising department in the food supply chain74 
 
In terms of supervision and inspection at all levels of the regulatory system, the system of 
control management at a central level has also been applied to the three levels of governance in 
China: provincial, city and county (see Figure 3), in other words, a clear, vertical, top down 
central to local responsibility has been defined, and horizontal coordination between 
departments is assumed.75 Furthermore, the Criminal Law Amendment of 2011 contains more 
severe punishment, including imprisonment alongside fines, for those violating food safety 
regulations. The FSL has abolished the possibility of exemption from inspection,76 and is in the 
process of developing a risk-based surveillance system involving the systematic sampling of 
priority foods at laboratories. And finally, initial steps have been taken with regard to food 
safety information systems, education and training. In 2011, the State Council's Food Safety 
Committee established a Food Safety Promotion Education Works Programme (2011 - 2015), 
to create a better public understanding of food safety and improved awareness of laws and 
regulations, and to enhance the training of inspectors.77  																																																								
74 According to Jia and Jukes 2013. 
75 Jia and Jukes 2013, p. 241. 
76 Exemption from control enabled the Sanlu dairy company to produce melamine-tainted baby formula for a 
period of time. 
77 Jia and Jukes 2013, pp. 242-243. 
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Figure 3. The supervision and administration departments at all levels FSL 200978 
 
 
 There is no doubt that the FSL represents significant improvements, but the literature after 
2009 still points to deficiencies in the system; most importantly, the lack of clear specification 
for food safety and supervision standards, and the weakness of the Chinese control system in 
the sense that the new responsibilities are defined within an old segmented model of ministerial 
departments and different levels of governance which still leads to gaps, especially at a local 
level. To give one simple example: if an unsafe food product turns up on a supermarket shelf, it 
is not always clear whether the problem originated during the food distribution stage, or at an 
earlier stage in the course of food processing.79 Subdivisions of regulatory departments at a 
local level are often reluctant to take responsibility for food safety issues, and the current 
system's ambiguity allows for this kind of behaviour. In addition, communication and 
cooperation between departments and regions has not improved and there is no effective 
information sharing mechanism among the regulatory departments, resulting in the sub-optimal 
allocation of resources such as facilities and inspectors.80 In my opinion, what is lacking in this 
critique on the FSL of 2009 by food scholars is the question of what the emphasis on the 																																																								
78 According to Jia and Jukes 2013. 
79 Li et al. 2010, p. 293. In the Netherlands the Ministry of Agriculture is responsible for the agricultural products, 
however, the other steps of the chain are managed by the NVWA (Nederlandse Voedsel- en Warenautoriteit) by 
order of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Ministry of Health. 
80 Jia and Jukes 2013, pp. 239-240; Li et al. 2010, pp. 292-293. 
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responsibility of food producers (Article 3 in FSL) actually entails. Articles 1 and 2 are about 
definitions in the FSL, Article 3 designates food producers and traders as the parties with 
responsibility for food business activities and food safety. This seems to imply at least a certain 
level of self-regulation, however, is not elaborated on further in the document, and not 
questioned or discussed in the academic literature. 
 
Food legislative and regulatory control: the State firmly in driving seat; receptive but 
reactive 
The organisation of effective food safety control in China's development pressure cooker is an 
immense and difficult task. Much progress has been made since the implementation of the FSL 
in 2009.81 Scholars attribute persistent food safety problems to an ineffective, segmented model 
of regulatory authority and a lack of clear quality and supervision standards. The literature does 
nothing to examine the ambiguity of the information contained in the FSL of 2009, which 
clearly designates responsibility to the food industry while at the same time specifically 
defining state control at all levels. In addition, the subject of private sector involvement in 
legislative and regulatory reforms is hardly mentioned,82 despite, in my opinion, being an 
important question in such a comprehensive innovation. 
 In the first step of the research83 I received little concrete information about the current 
legislative and regulatory framework other than that the government is constantly making 
regulatory changes in response to issues, that the number of policies is increasing, and that it is 
difficult to understand unless you are a specialist regulatory affairs manager.84 Some 
respondents confirmed the lack of clarity with regard to how to interpret regulations and to 
assess when a new regulation will take effect and in what way,85 and also said that mutual trust 
between people and local political goodwill, rather than reliance on institutions, are still the key 
to doing business. One respondent mentioned that as long as you can still 'buy' certifications in 
the market, trust in the system will not be sufficient to make regulation and control work 
effectively. This input seems to confirm the critique expressed in the academic literature. On 
																																																								
81 It is worth remembering that the EU traceability law only took effect in 2002, which, according to contact A, 
resulted in considerable stress within food companies to comply at the time. 
82 In Jia and Jukes 2013, p. 239 there is one reference to the possible involvement of the food producers, however, 
this is taken from an official source: "The food safety standards also solicited and took opinions from food 
producers, traders and consumers before enacting (MOH, 2011 a,b)". 
83 Contacts or respondents are not mentioned if the subject of their statement may be sensitive. 
84 Remarks made by Contact C and D.  
85 Contact C, also mentioned by respondent I. 
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the other hand, it is also recognised that the 'culture of dependence'86 still exists in Chinese 
business operations; food production processors are used to operating based on control and 
sanctions from government officials and are not yet ready to assume complete ownership of 
food quality assurance themselves. Illustrative of this point is the fact that Chinese operators 
can not object to or refuse any request from a government official, ‘because it is the 
government that asks’.87 Another example is the common experience that Chinese employees 
are used to following orders without questioning the reason why, so when asked during quality 
audits why certain things are done in the production process, the answer is ‘because the boss 
wants it that way’.  
 As this part of my research still produced a mixed picture of perceptions of the current 
legislative and regulatory framework and no clear assessment of its development, I prioritised 
this question in my on-location inquiry. Three of the six company interviews included an 
interview with the director or manager of QA & RA (Quality Assurance and Regulatory 
Affairs), all of whom were native Chinese.  
 The on-location interviews88 in Shanghai and Jiangsu province, and in particular the 
interviews with the specialist QA & RA managers,89 offered new insights into perceptions of 
the current legislative and regulatory framework at a food production level, which were in 
contrast to the views expressed in the academic literature. All respondents regarded the current 
food legislation as clear and transparent. They see the 2015 update of the FSL90 as much more 
comprehensive and detailed.91 For example, in the 2009 version, article 67, regarding the 
labelling of food products, contained barely four lines of text, while in the 2015 version it takes 
up almost a whole page and includes a detailed description of every aspect of the label, as well 
anew elements such as: 'table of ingredients or formulations', 'code of product standard(s)', 
'storage requirement', 'generic name of the food additives as determined by national standards', 
etc. According to two respondents who have been involved in the building of a factory in 
China, it is clear what production standards must be complied with to obtain a food production 
license,92 ‘You 'just' have to fill out 30 forms, prepare 10,000 product samples for testing and 
wait three months for the approval’. And to get the product certified for the QS tag is also seen 
as straightforward: ‘There are quality standards for any kind of food product, we produce X and 
																																																								
86 A term mentioned by Delman 2003, p. 13. 
87 A point made by contact C.  
88 Respondents are not mentioned if subject or statement may be sensitive. 
89 Respondents III, VI and VIII. 
90 FSL 2015. 
91 This point was in detail discussed with respondents IV, V, VI, VII and X. 
92 Respondents IX and X. 
	 22	
belong to product type XX with a certain GB (guojia biaozhun),93 and that specifies clearly 
what is permitted in terms of micro-biological levels, what the required in process temperatures 
are, what the required storage temperatures are, etc... It all makes sense’.94. Furthermore, the 
2015 FSL clearly puts responsibility for food production with the lower level FDA. None of the 
interviewees were unclear about who their official counterpart was (FDA for domestic 
production, AQSIQ for import/export) or what was decided at a local or provincial level (FDA) 
and what at a central level (CFDA). For example, QS certification for non-sensitive foods can 
be dealt with at a county/city level, changes in production process, as well as the 3-yearly 
renewal of the production license, will be decided at a provincial level, and the registration of 
recipes for infant milk powder has to be dealt with by the CFDA in Beijing. But responsibility 
at a local level also means that some variation in implementation is unavoidable. For example, 
one respondent95 mentioned that the city-level FDA in Shanghai – renowned for its strictness – 
has been known to install cameras in sensitive production facilities, such as meat processing 
sites. Another example of different interpretation locally was one company who moved a 
facility to another district and had to make all sorts of changes to comply with the new district's 
interpretation.96  
 There are also downsides to the clearer designation of responsibility at local level. Because 
local officials then become personally responsible for any issue within their area of jurisdiction, 
and in view of many recent cases involving the severe punishment of officials, officials at the 
local level are not willing to take any chances. One interviewee stressed this point,97 explaining 
that even the local fire brigade official who has given approval for a production facility will be 
liable for life, even after his retirement, in the event of a problem. Several companies98 
mentioned the problems they encounter if their production process or product differs from the 
stated policy or GB, even if the variation is an improvement in terms of quality or process. No 
official is willing to take responsibility, either at a local level or at a provincial level. An 
example from the dairy industry clearly illustrates this point. 99 In Europe it is customary to use 
'wet blending' in diary production, which means that different types of raw milk are blended 																																																								
93 GB (guojia biaozhun) is the abbreviation for National Standard; in food there are GBs for most product types, a 
GB contains the requirements a product has to comply with and is used for testing. Previously, if there was no GB 
for a given food product type it meant that there were no specific requirements other than the general ones in the 
FHL or FSL, however, more recently, with the clear responsibility for food issues at a local level and severe 
punishments, the lack of a GB for a given product means that no official will be willing to sign it off (discussed 
with respondents VI, IX and X).  
94 Quote from respondent IX.  
95 Respondent II.  
96 Discussed with respondent IV.  
97 Respondent IX.  
98 Discussed with respondents I, II, VIII and X. 
99 Discussed with contact C. 
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before being spray dried to produce the final product. This is known to result in a more stable 
and better quality end product. In China, dairy processors use a dry blending process, which 
means that each raw milk type is first spray dried and different milk powders are later mixed to 
produce the end product. It is this type of process which is described in the GB for milk powder 
(simply because other processes are unknown or not used in Chinese operations) and thus it is 
not permitted to use the wet blending process, even though it is known to produce a better 
quality product. One respondent in a sensitive food industry mentioned another case where the 
provincial government was asked to approve some alterations (improvements) to the 
production facility. They escalated the request to central level for written consent; central level 
refused and referred the case back to provincial level, stating that it was their responsibility. A 
few other respondents100 mentioned that they were very keen to avoid any ambiguity, and 
usually took the safe route and adopted the strictest requirements; the requirements of 
international companies are often more stringent than those of the Chinese.  
 On the question of whether the companies were involved in drafting policy or evaluation, 
all respondents reacted affirmatively. Draft policies are generally posted on the department's 
website, and comments from companies are invited, which then will be included in the next 
draft. As for implementation, grace-periods are often taken into account. Some local officials 
invite companies in their district for discussion seminars or training sessions concerning new 
policies.101 For the sensitive industries, the Chinese Food Risk Assessment Centre (CFRAC) 
invites experts and key players from the industry to Beijing for discussion sessions about policy 
trajectories, sometimes two to three years in advance of implementation.102 One of the 
respondents was regularly invited to these sessions, and praised the transparent and 
professional way of working. Another way of being involved in policy making is through food 
universities. One of the respondents103 mentioned that specialist universities are often given the 
task of drafting GBs, and building a close relationship with these universities is one way for 
private companies to become involved early on in policy development. It also works the other 
way around: universities responsible for drafting GBs for certain food industries often consult 
specialist firms, both Chinese and international, to participate, because they have access to a 
global knowledge and data networks. Finally, most respondents have experienced cases of 
unreasonable or impossible policies, for example, the maximum contaminant level of another 
category has been applied without checking the applicability to the category in question, EU or 
																																																								
100 Respondents IV, IX and X. 
101 Discussed with respondent III. 
102 Point raised by respondent VIII.  
103 Respondent X.  
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Japanese legislation has been wrongly interpreted, or raw product-levels have been confused 
with refined product-levels.104 In all the cases discussed with the respondents the officials had 
been receptive to reasoned argument, and had adapted the policy accordingly. The opportunity 
for involvement in and reaction to policy making is not, however, the same as more self-
regulation. Above all else, the current legislative and regulatory regime is about control and 
testing, ‘they are mad about testing, they test everything’ one contact remarked.105 In general, 
the respondents acknowledged that this is probably currently the best route. As one respondent 
put it: ‘you have to use very strict regulation to help people set up good habits, then the habit 
becomes the common sense way for the next generation. This is the way’.106 
 Criticism of the current system at production level is mostly with regard to its reactive, 
rather than pro-active, nature. Regulatory development follows issues in the market, or happen 
as a result of educational work by international or innovative companies, producing a constant 
stream of new policies and policy changes. Several respondents mentioned examples of how 
they had to 'educate' officials about innovative, effective, more qualitative or safer way of 
working.107 One example clearly illustrates this point: the warehouses of production companies 
were traditionally in-house, meaning they were part of the production facility; production 
regulation requirements stated that warehouses should be part of the production premises. As 
companies grew larger and space became scarce, companies had to look for other alternatives 
and began outsourcing the warehousing element of their production. Since this did not conform 
to the regulations, this way of working was not approved. The respondent in question related 
how they had to provide argumentation, give examples of how this system works in Western 
countries, and arrange inspections of these third-party warehouses. Eventually the State 
officials came to understand this new way of working, were convinced that it did not 
compromise quality levels, and adapted the regulations. Another general criticism is of the 
approach of the State's regulatory process, which is rigid, political and scientific rather than a 
more business-oriented approach based on knowledge of the production process. This 
sometimes leads to unnecessary and impractical requirements, takes time and is often a costly 
process for companies. One respondent108 remarked that the State focuses on end-product 
standards and hardware requirements in production facilities due to lack of knowledge of the 
production process flow combined with a lack of trust in the company to take responsibility. 
For example, the company in question was required to build different changing rooms for 																																																								
104 Several cases from respondent II, VIII, and X. 
105 Contact D. 
106 Remark by respondent VIII. 
107 Point mentioned by respondents II, IV, VIII. 
108 Remark by respondent IX.  
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workers – in the food processing area, primary packaging area and outer packaging area – to 
prevent cross-contamination, despite the fact that the company's factory layout and overall 
hygiene plan clearly assured food safety. It is also not unusual for companies to have to wait 
several months for approval, or to be forced to stop production while they await approval of 
minor process alterations. This lack of business knowledge and experience sometimes also 
results in unrealistic regulatory reform or irrational requirements. One example given in the 
previous section is the regulation in dairy processing that required packaging into consumer 
products to take place at the same location as the processing. This was a regulation that had to 
be implemented within one year. It was an attempt to phase out small milk powder mixing 
facilities, recognised as the type of place where counterfeiting is regularly detected. The size of 
the industry in question and the vast number of processors involved nationwide made this 
regulation impossible to implement within one year, and so it was subsequently not put into 
effect at all, and the respondent remarked that a year after the announcement nothing more was 
heard about it. Another example is of a company that produces a food supplement as its end 
product, but wants to sell that same product as a food ingredient.109 In Europe, it is no problem 
to produce a product destined for different purposes in one facility as long as it complies with 
the standards for all the product categories. In China, however, this is not possible, because of 
the previously mentioned 'end-product focus' and the rigid application of the legislation. A 
single factory is not permitted to produce an end-product and an ingredient at the same time, 
even if it is exactly the same product. To comply with the current standards, the company is 
required to build another factory, and in the present atmosphere of risk-averse officials it will 
be difficult to bend the rules. 
 My on-location inquiry presents a different picture of the current government’s legislative 
and regulatory framework than that offered in academic literature: the framework is clear and 
transparent, responsibilities are defined at all levels, and the private sector is involved in policy 
making in several ways – although this is not the same as increased self-regulation. Negative 
points are the lack of a proactive and business-oriented approach, and an inflexible application 
of legislation. To sum up: there is little confusion about what is required of food processors by 
law and who is in the driving seat, which leaves no responsibility at food-production level other 
than that of compliance. As one respondent mentioned: “I really see no development towards 
more self-regulation, companies do everything to be and remain compliant”. The next section 
looks into the role and importance of industry associations in the state-private nexus. 
 
																																																								
109 Example discussed with respondent X. 
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Significance of industry associations in China 
Industry associations in Europe occupy an independent position in between the State and 
private sector, and their role is of great importance in most sectors. A European QA manager of 
an international company110 summed it up as follows: ‘Quality is the key to their existence, it is 
their reason for being, to increase the quality standards of the sector is their ambition’. The 
literature on food safety control systems barely touches on this subject, other than mentioning 
industry associations, such as the China Dairy Industry Association, the Shanghai Dairy 
Association and the National Swine Industry Association.111 Only Delman112 briefly discusses 
the role of 'other institutional stakeholders' in food processing in the beginning of 2000s. His 
observation is that old and new associations are still controlled by the party-state and are 
obliged to follow the Party line, even though they call themselves 'non-governmental' 
(feizhengfu xingde or minban). He is not hopeful about a meaningful independent role of 
industry associations in the near future in China, although he does mention the ambitions of 
initiatives to play a more independent and important brokering role between the State and 
industry, with the objective of working on quality standards for the sector. The status and 
significance of industry associations in the market is an important aspect to discuss in this 
paper because it is indicative of whether the State (and the market) is ready for a more shared 
cross-sector approach to business representation and control.  
 The first step of my research confirmed the existence of these associations, but resulted in 
no further insights into their structure, independent status and role. The interviews in Shanghai 
and Jiangsu in the second step of my research, however, were useful in supplying information 
on how the industry association cooperate with production companies in practice.113 All 
companies interviewed were members of at least one industry association, and often of several. 
A medium to large international company, for example, can be a member of the regional 
industry association of a particular sector or sectors, as well as the national industry association 
and sometimes a relevant EU/International industry association. One of the interviewed 
Shanghai based Chinese companies, a fish processing company, is a member of the Shanghai 
Fishery Association.114 Often it is the company's QA & RA manager as well as the Managing 
Director or General Manager who are active in these industry association. The feedback of the 
respondents on the usefulness of these organisations was mixed; some regarded them as 
																																																								
110 Contact A. 
111 Delman 2003, p. 24; Schneider 2016, p. 12. 
112 Delman 2003, pp. 24-25. 113	Respondents are not mentioned if subject or statement is possibly sensitive.	
114 Discussed with respondents II and III. 
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nothing more than a place for networking, and not very influential or as an obligatory 
membership. Others proclaimed their usefulness in information sharing, preparing documents 
for obtaining a production license, or as a vehicle to consolidate industry opinion on a certain 
issue to communicate to the government. And naturally, as in Europe, much depends on the 
particular industry, industry association and its management; there are many differences.  
 In terms of how these industry associations operate as intermediary between the State and 
private sector, there are many similarities with the way it works in Europe. The flow of 
information goes both ways: companies use the industry association to consolidate opinions on 
an industry issue with, for example, a new regulation, and channel it via the association to the 
authorities, and authorities use industry associations to communicate new policy or pre-policy 
information or a request for information in an early phase of regulatory development115. One 
respondent mentioned that it depends on the kind of issue you are facing as a company, if it is a 
problem common to the whole industry, the industry association is the preferred channel.116 
The difference to Europe, however, is that the industry associations in China are closely linked 
to the State, as all respondents confirmed. One respondent clarified: ‘From the outside it looks 
like an independent association, no official government people inside, independent finances, 
but in fact these kind of associations are set up on government instruction, and government 
“moves” people to set up such an organisation’. In other words, industry Associations in China 
are most often set up at the initiative of authorities, and also regularly include both serving and 
ex- government officials in their management. From our Western perspective we would 
consider this lack of independence as a negative characteristic, however, several respondents 
mentioned that for them this was actually a positive point. The above mentioned respondent 
said: ‘The function of the association is that the government helps the industry in the business 
side or the technology side’. In their opinion, the close links between the association and the 
authorities were a confirmation of its usefulness; one respondents characterised the industry 
associations as a 'state lubricant', and explained that sometimes in the industry there is a lot of 
emotion and the industry association can reduce the emotion to the authorities in their 
contact.117 But information the authorities do not want to put on the table openly, can also be 
channelled via industry associations. In fact, the industry association can be seen as another 
semi-official window facilitating businesses and complementing the official FDA regulatory 
window. One respondent's comments sum it up quite clearly, saying that in China the State will 
do everything to encourage and grow businesses, and industry associations are part of the plan 																																																								
115 Based on respondents VIII, IX and X. 
116 Discussed with respondent VIII. 
117 Comment from respondent VIII. 
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to achieve that objective.118  
 My research into the current status and importance of industry associations in China is 
exploratory in nature and requires further study for more substantial evidence. Initial findings 
indicate that food industry associations in China operate in a similar way to those in Europe, 
serving as two-way intermediaries between the State and private sector, but are not independent 
of the State, on the contrary, they are often set up by the State and follow the State's agenda. 
Still, they are considered to serve a useful purpose by the food industry, as they fulfil a 
necessary facilitating role in the sometimes strained contacts between regulatory administrative 
departments and the private sector. The final part of my argumentation follows in the last 
section and debates the usefulness of Beck's theory of 'risk society' in understanding China's 
path to modernisation and to the risk perception of the key stakeholders in food supply. 
 
China's path to modernisation and Beck's "Risk Society"  
German sociologist Ulrich Beck's theory of Risk Society119 is often cited in discussions on the 
hazards of modern times, such as ecological crises, terrorist threats, global financial crises and 
food safety scares. Beck's theory is useful when trying to understand a world that seems 
unhinged, because he explains how the continuous modernisation of society has 'produced' and 
is still generating 'manufactured' risks: risks which are not caused by fate, act of God, nature or 
other external forces; on the contrary, they are the product of human decisions; they are 
industrially, scientifically and culturally produced. According to Beck, ‘the gain in power from 
techno-economic “progress” is being increasingly overshadowed by the production of risks’.120 
Western nations have made the transition from an ‘industrial society’ to a ‘risk society’,121 and 
because we are increasingly more connected, the repercussions of these risks are greater in 
scale.122 Beck illustrates this as follows: ‘A universalization of hazards accompanies industrial 
production, independent of the place where they are produced: food chains connect practically 
everyone on earth to everyone else’.123 One of the foundations of Beck's theory is the concept 
of reflexive modernity: in the latter part of the 20th century, traditional societies transformed 
through early modernity into a late or reflexive modernity in which individualism deepened, 
and in the formation of modern society, new classes of people began to reflect on their 
																																																								
118 Comment from respondent X. 
119 Beck 1992. 
120 Beck 1992, p. 13. 
121 The foundation of Beck's theory is based on an analysis of European societies, it is therefore sometimes 
criticised as Eurocentric, however, Beck later extended his argumentation to include developing countries.  
122 Veeck et al. 2010, p. 223.  
123 Beck 1992, p. 36. 
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relationship with the institutions and structures of society. Beck describes how these modern 
national institutions and nation-state structures are not organised to respond adequately and 
control the 'manufactured' risks.124 He calls for the opening up of policy making to greater 
levels of public accountability and shared responsibility.125  
 In this paper, I raise doubts as to whether Beck's plea against the logic of traditional control 
by government institutions is applicable to China, because China is following a different path 
to modernisation as compared to European nations. In this section, first the application of 
Beck's theory to developments in China will be discussed, as well as similar ideas from two 
other scholars. This will be followed by an assessment of the current reality of how 
stakeholders in the food supply chain are reacting to 'risk society' in China: in other words, how 
are the key stakeholders in food supply experiencing the risks associated with rapid 
transformation in the food infrastructure, and how are they responding to state institutions?  
 
Risk society has come to China 
As stated in the title of this paper, 'risk society' has come to China in the sense that Chinese 
society is becoming increasingly exposed to 'manufactured' risks; the consequences of the fast 
pace of modernisation process in China. The outbreak and spread of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS) in 2002, and other serious incidents, such as the melamine-tainted baby 
milk formula in 2008 – but more especially the bureaucratic mismanagement of these public 
health incidents – may signal that risk perception has become an important new factor in the 
lives of Chinese people, and that risk management will be added to the criteria of legitimacy of 
the Chinese party-state.126 One aspect of 'risk society' is that the level or potential of risk is no 
longer something for experts alone to decide, but has also become a function of public 
perception: in other words, social and cultural judgements have become important in risk 
assessment.127 If people experience a risk as real, it becomes real as a consequence.128 Non-
state actors can challenge official assurances, leading to public mistrust and sometimes even 
anger towards state administrators. In democratic systems, this poses challenges to the 
traditional institutions of governance, however, it presents an even greater challenge to non-
democratic political systems, because authoritarian models rely to a much greater extent on a 
limited number of institutions which can be held responsible for all aspects of political, 
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economic and social life, and which are insulated from public debate;129 in Beck's words, the 
system obstructs reflexivity. 
 When we look at the development of China in the past decades from the perspective of 
Beck's theory of Risk Society, China is going through a 'compressed modernization', combining 
a largely industrial state with elements of a post-industrial state.130 The accompanying rapid 
development of science and technology should be combined with a series of changes in social 
structure and politics, such as individualisation, and reflection on science and technology and 
on the political system. Beck advocates an opening up of previously depoliticised areas of 
decision-making, global communication and cooperation and greater levels of public 
accountability, in order to maintain social trust.131 Social trust is an important precondition for a 
modern and stable society, and the accompanying legitimacy is indispensable for the Chinese 
party-state.132 The widespread production and distribution of contaminated and fake food 
products in China in the past 15 years has posed challenges to social trust. If the Chinese 
government reacts by increasing the number of regulations and supervisory standards, 
regulatory agencies and committees – in other words, more control – this will produce a false 
sense of security (the risks are still there). In addition, according to Beck and other scholars 
inspired by his theory, this reaction will turn China away from becoming a more open modern 
society, will be ineffective due to the fragmented authoritarianism of the Chinese bureaucratic 
state, and could even lead to 'reflexive secrecy': a non-communicative society where nobody 
has or takes real responsibility.133  
 The scenario described above is exaggerated in my opinion, however, other scholars also 
object to the logic of control long held by the Chinese government and prefer more open, 
collaborative mechanisms. Pei et al. propose a co-regulation approach: a phased structural 
reform of both the public and private sector in which the public sector designs clear guidelines 
for the food industry (instead of new legislation) and economic incentives to upgrade 
companies' quality systems, while the private sector commits to the gradual implementation of 
a quality assurance system (rather than quality control).134 Song and Tian propose a synergetic 
rather than a segmented approach, in which departments across all stages of the production 
chain collaborate with the help of a cross-department information platform. In addition, they 
suggest a food safety credit supervision platform, also across the stages of the production chain, 
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where stakeholders collaborate: i.e. government with industry and consumers, to collect 'from 
farm to table' credit information which can be evaluated against food standards.135  
 
China's path to modernisation and risk perception 
In my opinion, the application of Beck's theory to China does not sufficiently take into account 
China's alternative path to modernisation; not only going through a compressed modernisation 
process, but also combining this with a change from a state-planned economy to a largely 
market-based economy, resulting in a mix of different benefits and risks. Benefits and risk 
resulting from the rapid transformation of the food production and supply system, and benefits 
and risks resulting from new market conditions such as the fast growth of privatised and private 
food companies, demand-driven pricing, and the availability of an extensive variety of products 
and brands from all over the world.136 Contrary to Beck's theoretical expectations, current 
reality in China demonstrates that the key stakeholders in food supply are not blaming the risks 
resulting from these rapid changes on failing government institutions.  
 Literature argues that Chinese consumers largely blame food safety problems on 
unscrupulous food processing industries and vendors.137 Frequent nationwide food safety 
incidents have increased consumer concern with regard to food quality and safety, and have 
resulted in a loss of confidence in the domestic food supply. In recent research, food safety was 
shown to be one of the top social concerns – above high food prices and corruption – and a 
2013 report by the Public Opinion Research Laboratory and Crisis Management Centre of 
Shanghai Jiao Tong University stated that Chinese consumers were 74% more concerned about 
the food industry than in 2011.138 As mentioned above, consumer research conducted in five 
major Chinese cities (Beijing, Nanjing, Changchun, Shijiazhuang and Kunming)139 confirmed 
these perceived potential food risks to a large extent. Consumers greatly appreciate the increase 
in the number of outlets and variety of food products, but experience has shown them that this 
comes at the cost of increased risk.140 What, in my opinion, is surprising, is that although 
Chinese consumers' risk perception of food safety is real and deepening, they do not attribute 
the problems to technological innovation, but rather to a misuse of technology by food 
producers and vendors,141 and that furthermore, far from their trust in the government's ability 																																																								
135 Song and Tian 2012. pp. 329-332; more collaboration between state and private sector also argued by 
Thompson and Hu 2007, p. 15. 
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to control having diminished, they believe that the level of control by state institutions needs to 
be increased.142  
 As for the other key stakeholders in food supply, the food processors, my research indicates 
that the production level is also largely supportive of the government's strategy to maintain, and 
in some areas even strengthen, supervision and control. As described in the first section, they 
understand that interference in supply chain development is desirable, particularly in order to 
phase out the smaller players, who are often inefficient and irresponsible. Some respondents in 
my research even advocated a harsher 'no tolerance' strategy at a local level to actually close 
down such unscrupulous small players and their 'old ways and bad habits'.143 Making lower 
level FDA officials personally liable for the food production companies in their area of 
jurisdiction is a necessary part of that strategy. Despite the burden of the continuous expansion 
and rigidity of the current regulatory control regime on professional and complying food 
production companies, as discussed in section two, there is also an understanding of the need to 
regain the trust of consumers in domestic production. The respondents all noted that they, as 
professional and quality conscious companies complying with all government regulations (and 
often even adopting higher standards), are the ones most damaged by the actions of 
unscrupulous food producers and processors, both in terms of consumer trust in food products 
in general, but in branded products in particular. A recent case of counterfeited cans of infant 
nutrition, purporting to be of the brand Similac from Abbott in China, illustrates this point 
clearly.144 Even though the Similac brand had itself been the victim of criminal activity, 
consumer trust and sales in the brand plunged.  
 To summarise: in terms of food safety control systems, Chinese consumers are not turning 
away from government institutions, on the contrary, they believe it is chiefly the task of the 
government to provide adequate food safety and quality control. My exploratory research 
indicates that professionals engaged in food production are generally positive about the 
government's strategy and step-by-step course of development and improvement, and do not 
point to major differences in perception of risks between the State and the private food 
processing sector. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that the Chinese State is not relinquishing control of the food supply 
chain for the benefit of self-regulation of food production companies. On the contrary, the State 																																																								
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appears to be tightening its grip on the course of national industrial development through direct 
and indirect interference in the food supply chain and an intensification of legislative and 
regulatory control in order to secure national food supply and increase food safety and quality. 
Through an examination of the perception at production level of the development of state 
influence versus self-regulation in a two-step exploratory research, I have reasoned that in 
contrast to the ambiguity portrayed in the literature, food processors are not confused about 
state strategy, the division of responsibilities or the role of industry associations. Furthermore, I 
have observed that both consumers and processors recognise that in China's current phase of 
development strict state control is probably the best way forward. Finally, based on analysis of 
the current stakeholders' perceptions of risks and responsibilities in the rapidly transforming 
food supply chain in China, I have raised doubts about the application of Beck's theory of 'risk 
society' to China.  
 The findings of my exploratory research are indicative, and require further validation to 
enable the drawing of conclusions. The dynamics of the Chinese food supply chain and global 
interactions also demand the regular monitoring of developments. The current political climate 
and importance attributed to food safety by Chinese society and the national and international 
media suggests that the State will not opt for more self-regulation of the food industry in the 
near future, and that this will in any case be a gradual, step-by-step development. One 
respondent summed it up as follows: ‘I think the Chinese government is on a good track, even 
though it is simply introducing and enforcing higher, stricter standards, and thereby 
discouraging smaller companies in their old ways, ..., I think at this point in time it is the only 
way, and maybe in twenty years time, when the industry is more mature, it will be time to 
relinquish some of the responsibility back to the companies’. In the meantime, as several 
respondents in my research mentioned, it would be advisable for foreign food companies who 
wish to do business in China to investigate in advance and in detail the relationship between the 
State and the private sector, and it is imperative that they employ native Chinese experts to 
advise on QA and regulatory affairs.  
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Appendices 
 
Research step one: set up and list of contacts and interviews145 
 
The first study was conducted from April until mid-May 2016, with some follow-up contact in 
June 2016. The main objective of this study was to gain a better understanding of the food 
supply chain structure in China and the extent of state interference in supply chain 
development, perception of state's regulatory reform, the EU's legislative and regulatory 
framework on food in comparison to China's, and finally the influence and role of industry 
associations in China as an intermediary between the State and private sector. Apart from the 
exchange of ideas, additional literature was supplied, e.g. companies' industry notes on specific 
food sectors in China and a company white paper on a particular food sector in China.  
 
List of contacts/interviewees: 
A. Ms E. Kruiper, currently Quality and Sustainability Manager at Wild Flavors Inc., the 
Netherlands, formerly Manager International CSR, R&D project leader and Food Legal 
Manager at Sara Lee Douwe Egberts Inc. Contact includes several telephone 
conversations, email contact and links to EU legislation from April until June 2016. 
B. Supply Chain Analyst at a Food & Agribusiness Research department of an 
international financial institution, the Netherlands. Contact includes telephone 
conversation, email contact and several industry notes from the company in April 2016. 
C. Mr A. Schaap, Director Dairy Development China, Royal Friesland Campina N.V., the 
Netherlands. Contact includes interview and several documents on Dairy development 
in China in May 2016. 
D. Global QA director at an international food company, the Netherlands. Contact includes 
email and telephone contact in May and June 2016.  
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Research step two: set up and list of contacts and interviews146 
 
The second study was conducted in the second half of May 2016 in the greater Shanghai region 
and Jiangsu province. Interviews were conducted with ten persons from six different food 
companies, ranging from small to large, local and international food production/processing 
companies, all of which primarily produce for the domestic market, with some also producing 
for the export market.147 Half of the interviews were conducted at the production facility, the 
remainder at company offices detached from the production facility. Interviews lasted from one 
to three hours, and sometimes included company presentations, images/videos of the 
production facility, and a tour of the premises. My request to enter and observe the production 
hall during the production process was denied by all companies due to company safety 
regulations. Of the ten interviewees, seven were Asian (of which five native Chinese, one from 
Hong Kong and one from South Korea) and three were European (all living and working for 
more than five years in China). The majority of the interviewees asked to remain anonymous 
and that their company's name not to be mentioned at all in this paper. In the contact 
confirming the interview details I also probed the possibility of arranging a meeting with a 
local FDA official or inspector, however, this was directly refused in all cases, and regarded as 
impossible; the nature of contact with officials is considered too crucial and sensitive. 
 
List of respondents:  
I. Mr L. Coolen, Managing Director Friesland Huishan JV, Shenyang, Liaoning province; 
Skype interview conducted on May 16, 2016. 
II. Ms M. Lu, Managing Director of Hollywin Seafood and Hofung Frozen Food, 
Fengxian, Shanghai; interview conducted at production facility on May 17, 2016.  
III. Mr Lü, QA director of Hollywin Seafood and Hofung Frozen Food, Fengxian, 
Shanghai; interview conducted at production facility on May 17, 2016. 
IV. R&D director of an international packaged goods food company, Shanghai; interview 
conducted at R&D centre on May 18, 2016. 
V. Microbiologist of an international packaged goods food company, Shanghai; interview 
conducted at R&D centre on May 18, 2016. 
VI. Technical manager (related to Legislation) of an international packaged goods food 																																																								
146 Several contacts have been anonymised on request. 
147 The companies interviewed are all operating at high standards, mostly higher, international standards than the 
required Chinese ones, and all are HACCP and ISO 22000 certified. Furthermore, the Shanghai area is apparently 
known for particularly strict supervision and control. I am aware that this is not representative in any way of food 
production, but it is sufficient for 'a' food production perspective. 
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company, Shanghai; interview conducted at R&D centre on May 18, 2016. 
VII. Product Developer of an international packaged goods food company, Shanghai; 
interview conducted at R&D centre on May 18, 2016. 
VIII. Senior Director RA & QA (Regulatory Affairs & Quality Assurance) of an international 
food manufacturing company, Shanghai; interview conducted at Shanghai office on 
May 19, 2016.  
IX. General Manager of an international packaged goods company, Taicang, Jiangsu 
province; interview at production facility on May 19, 2016. 
X. Operations Director of a food supplements and ingredients company, production facility 
in Taicang, Jiangsu province; interview conducted on May 20, 2016.  
 
 
 
